His realizing that the internal consistency of historically salient scientific texts is often hidden was what diverted Kuhn from a career of research in science to one about science. He was fond of describing his first such discovery in 1947. Enlisted as a graduate student to teach a General Education course in 17th century mechanics, Kuhn had struggled to find a way of reading Aristotle's texts on motion that did not make them appear foolish. "One memorable (and very hot) summer day those perplexities suddenly vanished" (Kuhn 1977, xi) . Through a "conceptual readjustment" he had found a way of thinking about motion that made the texts entirely reasonable, at least as far as they went. More importantly, he concluded, a corresponding conceptual readjustment had to have occurred historically, giving those who developed 17th century mechanics a way of thinking about motion that opened Aristotle's remarks to objection. This stood in direct conflict with the picture of how scientific knowledge develops that Kuhn had acquired as a student of science. "What my reading of Aristotle seemed therefore to disclose was a global sort of change in the way men viewed nature and applied language to it, one that could not properly be described as constituted by additions to knowledge or by the mere piecemeal correction of mistakes" (Kuhn 1977, xiii) . If conceptual shifts of this sort are in some way characteristic of science, then a new picture of how scientific knowledge develops was needed. Moreover, the best way to pursue this new picture was by probing "the fundamental conceptual readjustment required of the historian to recapture the past or, conversely, of the past to develop toward the present" (Kuhn 1977 Kuhn's work in history throughout the decade was naturally consonant with the belief, just then becoming common among the growing cadre of professional historians of science, that the science of a particular period and place must be taken on its own terms and not judged according to what later scientists conceive to hold true of the world. This "anti-Whig" view was not, perhaps, thoroughly analyzed at the time, but, increasingly, histories of science appeared that did not ask of past science where it was going to, but rather where it had come from. Kuhn's approach certainly fit into this emerging tradition. Kuhn added an important component to the anti-Whig standpoint, namely the view that science is best thought of as a skilled practice, though he did not use those words at the time. Like all skills, those of the scientist, Kuhn thought, must be acquired through an elaborate form of training, usually including apprenticeship in the relevant technical arcana of the neophyte's specific field, as well as initiation into the field's canonical models (such as spring balances, or orbiting particles, or special chemical combinations, or thermal processes in gases, and so on). Science, for the early Kuhn, was much more like the work of the goldsmith than the contemplative art of the philosopher.
Kuhn's Copernican Revolution displays this view. His Copernicus was not a philosophically-minded maker of new systems, nor was Copernicus' goal, in Kuhn's account, specifically to reduce the complex mechanisms of Ptolemaic eccentricities, deferents, and epicycles. Kuhn's Copernicus was first and foremost a technical astronomer, a man who knew how to work with the mathematical apparatus of 16th century astronomy. He was driven by a desire to solve incongruities that emerged within that system's structure. In his essential nature, Kuhn's Copernicus was little different from, say, Sadi Carnot in the early 19th century, or Max Planck at its end, both of whom Kuhn wrote about during the next twenty years. All were concerned fundamentally with solving problems that they perceived to exist within the technical apparatus of a given system, and each sought to deploy the tools and skills he had learned in attacking his problem. Of Copernicus, for example, Kuhn remarked: Above all, Copernicus' dedication to the celestial motions is responsible for the painstaking detail with which he explored the mathematical consequences of the earth's motion and fitted those consequences to an existing knowledge of the heavens. That detailed technical study is Copernicus' real contribution. Both before and after Copernicus there were cosmologists more radical than he, men who with broad brush strokes sketched an infinite and multipopulated universe. But none of them produced work resembling the later books of De Revolutionibus, and it is these books which, by showing for the first time that the astronomer's job could be done, and done more harmoniously, from a moving earth, provided a stable basis from which to launch a new astronomical tradition. (Kuhn 1957 Readers of this journal scarcely need reminding that Kuhn is best known for this 1962 monograph, which has been translated into many languages. In remarkably few words, Kuhn advanced the argument that the development of science cannot be understood simply as a process in which more accurate conceptions gradually replace less accurate ones under the impetus of experiment. Though he certainly did think that the body of scientific knowledge becomes increasingly coherent and powerful over time, Kuhn insisted that scientific theories (often together with the instruments and experiments that are associated with them) should be understood as tightly integrated wholes that do not easily, or perhaps ever, change bit by bit. Nor, he argued further, is it historically fruitful to judge the power of one scientific scheme in direct comparison with its successor or predecessor.
Kuhn asserted in SSR that the transition from immature to mature science occurs when practitioners reach agreement over fundamental matters, perhaps even constituting thereby a new discipline. This takes place in conjunction with the production of a coherent theory about, and instruments for the investigation of, the natural phenomena with which they are concerned, i.e., a paradigm. Scientists, Kuhn noted, are trained to think about their particular subject within the special confines of a given paradigm, competing with one another in attempts to solve puzzles that arise within it. Kuhn characterized this behavior as normal scientific activity. As normal science continues, problems that resist the puzzle-solver's skill eventually emerge out of novel calculations or explanations, out of observation, or out of the laboratory. When the resulting anomaly destabilizes the existing consensus, Kuhn insisted, an entirely new paradigm may abruptly emerge as the previous complex of theory and experiment is radically and fundamentally reconceived. Progress occurs through normal scientific activity, in Kuhn's view, because mathematics, devices, and explanations are produced that carry forward in special ways into the body of a successor paradigm. Although carry-over from paradigms to their successors often masks the magnitude of change, nevertheless revolutions, large and small, inevitably occur because paradigms invariably include elements that are arbitrary.
As The concept of paradigm was indeed tightly bound to the notion of normal science and, therefore, to the concept of canonical or exemplary problems.
In "Second Thoughts on Paradigms," a 1969 paper presented at a philosophy symposium (Kuhn 1974) , and in the "Postscript" to the 1970 second edition of SSR, Kuhn conceded that he had used 'paradigm' too broadly. As he remarked a few years later in the Preface to The Essential Tension.
Having begun simply as exemplary problem solutions, they [paradigms] expanded their empire to include, first, the classic books in which these accepted examples initially appeared and, finally, the entire global set of commitments shared by the members of a particular scientific community. That more global use of the term is the only one most readers of the book have recognized, and the inevitable result has been confusion: many of the things there said about paradigms apply only to the original sense of the term. Though both senses seem to me important, they do need to be distinguished, and the word "paradigm" is appropriate only to the first. (Kuhn 1977 , xix-xx) Kuhn accordingly proposed the phrase 'disciplinary matrix' for the shared commitments of the community, and the word 'exemplars' for the exemplary problem solutions. This amounted, however, only to a verbal clarification, and not to a retreat from his vision of the central role played by paradigms in scientific development. Kuhn still held that scientists learn to practice their discipline through exemplars, and that in the process they assimilate a way of thinking that forms the core of a disciplinary matrix. He continued also to insist that scientific knowledge develops largely through revolutionary conceptual readjustments in which new exemplars become canonical and a new disciplinary matrix replaces the old.
Kuhn never did retreat in any important way from the controversial conclusions about scientific knowledge that he had drawn in the second half of SSR, most significantly his notion of incommensurability. Some readers found the consequences especially difficult to grasp or to accept. "Though the world does not change with a change of paradigms," Kuhn remarked in a famous turn of phrase, "the scientist afterward works in a different world.... I am convinced that we must learn to make sense of statements that at least resemble these" (Kuhn 1970, 121 ). Indeed, he added a few pages later, "we may ... have to relinquish the notion, explicit or implicit, that changes of paradigm carry scientists closer and closer to the truth" (Kuhn 1970, 170 ). Kuhn's claims provoked strong resistance, particularly within the philosophic community. Many felt, and continue to feel, that SSR did not fit well with claims to rationality and objectivity, however formulated, for scientific knowledge. Others saw SSR as advancing theses about science that seemed to be paradoxical. The remark just quoted is one of many examples: "though the world does not change .. ., the scientist afterward works in a different world." Generally, Kuhn did want to assert that the advanced sciences achieve the most reliable form of knowledge, yet he wished also to challenge the standard reasons for holding this to be true. The picture of how science develops that Kuhn had formed came not out of philosophical reasoning, but from personal encounters with episodes in the history of science. The seemingly conflicting positions that his critics accused him of trying to maintain were merely artifacts of the way he communicated this picture (e.g., "I am convinced that we must learn to make sense of statements that at least resemble these"). SSR was an interim report of a project in progress. Once the picture of how science develops was elaborated in more detail, and once the factors lying behind it had been investigated more thoroughly, ways of delineating it would, he thought, emerge that would be less open to philosophic complaint.
Opposition to SSR did not prevent its impact on the philosophy of science. The "problem of conceptual change"-i.e., the problem of incorporating something akin to Kuhn's conceptual readjustments into an account of the cumulative growth of scientific knowledge-took center stage in the wake of SSR. Furthermore, science after SSR was less frequently viewed as a static body of knowledge calling for logical analysis. Philosophers of science began to look more closely and in much greater detail at the historical development of science, and they became increasingly attentive to the complexities of scientific practice. In this piece, one sees many of the elements at work that Kuhn insisted on in the writing of history, in particular the close, concentrated attention to the background of problems from which a scientist begins, the tools that the scientist has available with which to attack disturbing difficulties, and the novel character of the system that may eventually emerge as scientists attempt to configure, reconfigure, and ultimately evolve the elements at their disposal in the face of recalcitrant problems.
Kuhn began his most detailed study of a particular scientific development in the early 1970s. The result, which became his last contribution to history proper, was his Black-Body Theory and the Quantum Discontinuity. This book, published in 1978, gives an account of Planck's route to his new theory of black-body radiation. Although Kuhn did not use the language of paradigm, normal science, anomaly, and crisis, his argument in Black-Body Theory nevertheless depended quite directly on these notions. For here, among other things, Kuhn sought to uncover a now-forgotten conception that, he believed, largely explains otherwise puzzling oddities in Planck's original route to the black-body radiation law.
Kuhn asserted that Planck had initially, and consistently, conceived his innovations to lie entirely within the purview of what was later termed classical physics. This claim required Kuhn to argue that what seemed to later commentators to be a puzzling incongruity in Planck's use of Boltzmann's combinatorics is odd only in retrospect-that, in Planck's initial scheme, the kinds of restrictions that were later placed on the energy spectra of oscillators (which Planck had, in agreement with tradition, called resonators) simply did not exist at all. Instead, according to Kuhn, Planck had worked in an entirely consistent way, varying energies across resonators at different frequencies, with no discrete restriction on the energy any single resonator might possess, but rather solely on the cell size of the energy space itself. The later understanding, by contrast, spread the energy proper in quantized fashion among resonators all at the same frequency.
Like most of his work, Kuhn's arguments in Black-Body Theory engendered a great deal of discussion, and they were not fully accepted by all historians of physics. Nevertheless, this book stands as his most detailed attempt to carry through for one episode what Kuhn claimed to hold for all of science. For here Kuhn found many of the elements he conceived to characterize scientific practice: an existing pattern from which a scientist begins; a problem, empirically engendered, that initially resists solution on that pattern; an attempt, in Kuhn's view largely consistent and successful, to solve the problem using common tools; and finally, the emergence of a novel structure, incommensurable in fundamental ways with its predecessor, with concomitant terminological, conceptual, and practical symptoms of confusion between incompatible structures. Reflecting five years later on Black-Body Theory, Kuhn remarked:
Concerned to reconstruct past ideas, historians must approach the generation that held them as the anthropologist approaches an alien culture. They must, that is, be prepared at the start to find that the natives speak a different language and map experience into different categories from those they themselves bring from home. And they must take as their object the discovery of those categories and the assimilation of the corresponding language. (Kuhn 1984, 246) These words are an appropriate introduction to the issue that occupied Kuhn for the remainder of his life, namely the manner in which scientific revolutions give rise to incommensurability. This notion was not as such clearly present in Kuhn's earliest work, nor in the Copernican Revolution, although in the latter case hints of the idea are scat-tered throughout the book as Kuhn sought constantly to contrast ways of thinking before and after Copernicus. By the late 1950s, however, there are signs that Kuhn was beginning to reason along the lines he was soon to elaborate in SSR. In his 1959 paper "Energy Conservation as an Example of Simultaneous Discovery," for example, Kuhn remarks that "to the historian acquainted with the concepts of energy conservation, the pioneers do not all communicate the same thing. To each other, at the time, they often communicated nothing at all" (Kuhn 1977, 72) . Still, the full-blown notion of fundamental, holistic incompatibility between conceptual schemes did not appear clearly until SSR itself.
The argument Kuhn provided for incommensurability in SSR was based on a philosophically dubious picture of reference. Indeed, the passage in question (Kuhn 1970, 98-103 ) is better regarded less as an argument for incommensurability than as Kuhn's initial attempt to analyze and to explain what lies behind the discontinuity in ways of thinking before and after major conceptual readjustments that he had observed in the history of science. The first indications of a different approach to analyzing and explaining such discontinuity surfaced in the discussion of natural kinds in the last section of "Second Thoughts on Paradigms" (Kuhn 1977, 308-319 ). This discussion, though tentative and exploratory, makes clear that Kuhn no longer thought that he had come fully to grips in SSR with what it means for scientific systems to be incommensurable with one another. The difficulties Kuhn had there in making this central notion precise were in part due to his reliance then on examples that he had not for the most part thoroughly probed himself, from which one cannot exclude even the Copernican revolution. For the fact is that Kuhn's emergent understanding of incommensurability could only gain sharp form and concrete substance through detailed historical analysis. His work with Heilbron on the Bohr atom, followed by his book on Planck, provided him with the kind of experience, and data, that he needed to develop the notion further. This is not to say that during these years-roughly from 1962 through 1978-Kuhn explored history in order to solve problems posed by SSR. Rather, he probed history with the cast of mind that SSR imperfectly reflected, and in so doing he began to understand with greater clarity what it might mean for systems to be incommensurable. The remainder of his career, after the publication of Black-Body Theory, was devoted to developing this meaning. The effort carried him further into philosophy and into current research in In each of these examples, I have described a set of past beliefs about some aspect of nature. To do that, however, I have needed also in each case to describe the meanings of a few of the terms in which these beliefs were stated. These terms, furthermore, have been of a special sort. Generally, they are among the names of taxonomic categories available to members of the speech community that uses them. They carry the community's ontology, supplying names for things which its world can and cannot contain. They are very like the terms that Mill described as the names of natural kinds. .. (Kuhn 1987) Several factors made natural-kind terms and the taxonomic distinctions they express an ideal point of entry for Kuhn. While an antecedent vocabulary is needed to learn them, they are learned through examples, with definition playing a negligible role. Kuhn accordingly began to develop an account of taxonomic categories of objects (such as kinds of optical waves or kinds of force). This account relied upon the principle that categories must be properly nested within one another-in other words, every category can be immediately subordinate to at most one ancestor (e.g., sound cannot be both a longitudinal disturbance and something that obeys Huygens' principle unless all longitudinal disturbances are subject to Huygens' principle). This requirement, which forbids partial overlap between categories, permitted Kuhn to recast his original concept of incommensurability into a more rigorous form since, on this new understanding, scientific systems can be commensurate with one another (or, in the term he often preferred, mutually translatable) only if they share the same taxonomic structure.
Scientific categories can accordingly be thought of, in first approximation, as forming a taxonomic tree. The tree trunk constitutes the major, all-encompassing category that distinguishes the group. Distinct branches emerge from the trunk, defining its immediate sub-kinds. Each branch may have its own sub-kinds, and each eventually terminates, which is to say that they end up in classes with no sub-kinds. Like the limbs of a tree, every kind therefore emerges directly from a single immediately preceding branch or else from the trunk itself. Because no kind descends from more than one immediate ancestor, there is no possibility of partial overlap among kinds (whereas if some kind A had, say, two otherwise-distinct immediate ancestors, then these two latter classes would have A in common and so would partially overlap one another). Any additions to Kuhn's tree of kinds must accordingly be grafted onto its structure without violating its integrity: additions can be made, but multiple connections between existing kinds cannot be forged, nor can new kinds be added unless they emerge directly from a preceding kind or from the trunk.
The obvious limitation of this taxonomic structure is that fundamental theoretical terms of the advanced sciences-terms like 'force' and 'mass'-do not fit directly into it. To use Kuhn's phrasing, they do not signify components of a contrast set. Nevertheless, they have most of the other key features of taxonomic kind-terms. Though an antecedent vocabulary is needed to learn them, they are not learned through definitions, but through examples-primarily the exemplary problems emphasized in SSR-and several complementary examples are usually required to assimilate them. Again, different individuals acquire them along different routes, yet communication is unaffected until anomalies emerge in ongoing scientific research. Terms like 'force' and 'mass' are not learned individually, but together, owing to the marked relations they have with one another as expressed in the law-like generalizations that are invoked in solving exemplary problems. Most important of all, a version of the no-overlap principle applies to them as well: no two incompatible generalizations can apply to the same theoretical term (e.g., there can be no force which satisfies both Newton's second law of motion and some other law incompatible with it).
Kuhn was thus led to distinguish two types of scientific kinds; he labeled the first type taxonomic kinds and the second, singletons or, in his last years, artefactual kinds. Taxonomic kinds are dominant in the formative years of a science, and they remain central to experimental and instrumental practices. Singletons, however, become increasingly important as a science advances and as theories develop. Both types have a web of structural relations among them, the totality of which comprised what Kuhn called the lexical structure of the lexicon. He was at work on the chapter describing in detail how these two types of kinds mesh to form this structure when his final illness felled him.
The notion of incommensurability takes on a new, more precise character in this setting. If two scientific schemes are commensurable, then their lexical structures can be fit together in one of the following two ways: (1) every kind, taxonomic or artefactual, in the one can be directly translated into a kind in the other, which means that the whole of one structure is isomorphic to some portion of the other; or (2) one structure can be grafted directly onto the other without otherwise disturbing the latter's existing relations. In the first case one scheme is subsumed by the other. In the second, a new scheme is formed out of the previous two, but it preserves intact all of the earlier relations among kinds. If neither case holds, then the two systems are incommensurable.
Many previously puzzling aspects of Kuhnian incommensurability begin now to vanish. Take, for example, the perennial question of whether schemes as wholes, or only certain terms in them, are "untranslatable" into other schemes and their terms. From the viewpoint of scientific kinds, the division that is implicit in the question cannot be sustained. A scheme as a whole can only mean (from this new perspective) its complete lexical structure. If this scheme can be superimposed onto a segment of another scheme, then not only is the former, as a whole, translatable into the latter, but so necessarily are its individual terms, because the structure consists of relationships between these terms. Conversely, if some term in one scheme overlaps more than one term in the other scheme, then it cannot be translated into any term in the latter, and it follows necessarily that some parts at least of the lexical structures must themselves have different relationships among their constituents. It has now become literally meaningless to divorce schemes as wholes from the terms whose mutual relationships they represent. Two lexical structures imply two distinct lexicons, and two lexicons that are distinct in this way cannot coherently describe the same world.
In rendering the notion of incommensurability more precise, Kuhn effectively narrowed its range of applicability. Kinds may indeed limit the term more than some may wish, because incommensurability here involves solely connectedness among terms, rather than, say, global considerations of meaning. Kinds begin to lose their pragmatic significance if they are applied, e.g., to differences as broad as the ones between Scholastic discourse and sixteenth-century English experimental philosophy. Such drastically different conceptual schemes certainly do seem, in some sense, to be incommensurable with one another, but not perhaps in the sense embraced by the doctrine of kinds. This difference notwithstanding, Kuhn's new account of incommensurability is not so much a revision of Structure as it is a deeper analysis of the conceptual readjustments that he had found to mark the history of science. The chief corollaries of incommensurability still remain, including its implications for concepts of truth:
If the notion of truth has a role to play in scientific development, which I shall elsewhere argue that it does, then truth cannot be anything quite like correspondence to reality. I am not suggesting, let me emphasize, that there is a reality which science fails to get at. My point is rather that no sense can be made of the notion of reality as it has ordinarily functioned in philosophy of science. (Kuhn 1992, 14) Kuhn continued strongly to believe that incommensurability, far from threatening science's authority, provided a clear way to understand why this form of knowledge is authoritative. Tom Kuhn's approach to the history and philosophy of science required learning to think, as far as he could, in the manner of his subjects, then to reflect on what he had learned and how he had learned it, and finally to filter more conventional historical and philosophical analysis through the results of this reflection. This gave all of his writings about science a distinctly personal dimension, for he was often looking inward more than outward. Reading him was by itself enough to give one a sense of the man behind the words. Those who had the fortune to know him as students and as colleagues benefited in another way from this personal dimension. Although we might enter a conversation with him knowing more of the historical details of a topic, or knowing more of the philosophic intricacies of an issue, we would consistently come away with new insights into what we had been thinking about, and with new questions to explore. Tom Kuhn was himself, in a customary sense of the term, a singleton. We will all work in a different world without him.
